



A VILLAGE-BASED CRVS FACILITATOR MODEL: Learning and Results

DECEMBER 2021

Chris Morris

KOMPAK

Jalan Diponegoro No. 72, Jakarta 10320 Indonesia

T: +62 21 8067 5000 | F: +62 21 3190 3090 | E: info@kompak.or.id

www.kompak.or.id

KOMPAK
Kolaborasi Masyarakat dan Pelayanan untuk Kesejahteraan
Kemitraan Pemerintah Australia - Indonesia

Overview

A simple premise underpins KOMPAK's work on civil registration. If access to civil registration services can be made quicker, cheaper and easier, a higher percentage of the population should come to possess civil registration documents. That, in turn, should ensure more citizens can access government services requiring proof of identity and status, and that government has better population data to inform policymaking and program implementation.

This paper documents KOMPAK's work in developing – in partnership with sub-national governments – a village-based CRVS Facilitator. Named *fasilitasi pelaksanaan layanan kependudukan di desa* or FPLKD for short, this approach is designed to lower barriers of time, cost and other difficulties, by offering civil registration services that can be facilitated at village level. It circumvents funding challenges at the district level by using village budgets to fund village-based facilitators who assist citizens with the process of applying for civil registration documents.

FPLKD is being implemented in five KOMPAK-supported provinces at varying scales. Having initially been pioneered in Aceh (in early 2018) and West Nusa Tenggara (NTB) (in early 2019) it has now been adopted in KOMPAK-supported districts in East Java, Central Java, and South Sulawesi. FPLKD models in Aceh and South Sulawesi is implemented more widely in compare to other provinces. Almost all villages in KOMPAK-supported subdistricts (usually 1-3 sub-districts per district) are applying the FPLKD model. Some replication is taking place in non-KOMPAK subdistricts in those districts, although at small scale.

The primary focus of the paper is to address three key learning priorities in relation to FPLKD, based around the themes of effectiveness, efficiency, and incentives. In other words, the questions to be considered are: (i) do village-based civil registration and vital statistics (CRVS) services work; (ii) if so, what is the best way to implement them; and (iii) why would governments want to do it?

Data constraints limit the extent to which firm conclusions can be drawn about the effectiveness of FPLKD. It is nevertheless very likely that FPLKD has made access to civil registration services cheaper and easier for citizens. It is harder to assess whether that has translated into more citizens possessing civil registration documents than would be the case without FPLKD. Again, it most likely has, but whether by a lot or a little remains unclear.

FPLKD has the potential to be more efficient of delivering village-based civil registration services. However, much depends on the details of how FPLKD is funded and implemented. What is clear is that the efficiency of FPLKD should be assessed on a village-by-village basis, rather than applied on a blanket basis across a district. Efficiency is assessed between the demand for documents and the cost/difficulty of citizens in obtaining those documents. Given demand for documents is likely to vary over time, so too may the appropriateness of the FPLKD model in a particular village.

Finally, a cautionary note is warranted in relation to the incentive structures that may support or undermine longer-term implementation of the FPLKD approach at scale. The main problem is that the district-level agency with the ability to authorise villages to fund FPLKD (the village community empowerment agency or DPMD) has no inherent institutional interest in widening access to civil registration services. Village funding for FPLKD is therefore at risk of being displaced by other funding priorities.

1. Why focus on civil registration?

Box 1

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

Article 24(2): Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.

SDG 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

Target 16.9: By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration.

Indicator: Proportion of children under 5 years of age whose births have been registered by a civil authority, by age.

For individuals, a civil registration document – be it a birth certificate, national identity card or something else – is far more than just a piece of paper. By serving as evidence of legal identity and age, it can facilitate access to a range of government services (including education, health and social protection) while also affording the holder a degree of protection from age-related harms (for example, child marriage).


For governments, civil registration and vital statistics (CRVS) can be an important source of data to help guide policy planning and service delivery. While some of this data can also be obtained through other means (for example, a census or household survey), effective CRVS systems have the potential to generate the data in a more timely manner and at lower cost.

1.1. Civil registration in Indonesia: Good, but still room for improvement

Indonesia is making steady progress towards its goal (and obligation to ensure) that every citizen has a birth certificate. In 2019, 86% of Indonesians aged under 18 years had a birth certificate, up from 79.9% five years earlier.

Table 1

Under-18s with a birth certificate in KOMPAK-supported provinces (2015–2020)




Source: Statistics Indonesia

However, birth certificate coverage rates are not uniform across the country (see Table 1). Central Java, for example, had achieved 95.1% coverage in 2019, compared with only 45.9% in Papua. However, even high-performing provinces have pockets where rates of possession of civil registration documents are significantly below the headline figure.

Those living in rural areas are less likely to have a birth certificate than those living in cities (see Table 2). Nationwide, the gap is 13.7 percentage points for the under-5 years group, narrowing to 10.2 percentage points for the under-18 years group (as at 2018). This pattern holds across most KOMPAK-supported provinces.

Table 2

Birth certificates by age and location (urban/rural)




Source: Statistics Indonesia (SUSENAS 2018)

Socio-economic status (but not gender) also influences the likelihood a child possesses a birth certificate (see Tables 3 and 4). Children in lower income groups are less likely to possess a birth certificate. In contrast, boys and girls have almost identical rates of birth registration (the rate for girls being marginally higher). Research by KOMPAK partner, PUSKAPA (2020), indicates that children with a severe disability are also less likely to possess a birth certificate.

Table 3


Under-5s birth certificate possession by income group (2019)



Source: Statistics Indonesia

Table 4

Under-18s with a birth certificate by income group and gender (2015–2019)



Source: Statistics Indonesia (SUSENAS 2018)

However, it is not just about birth certificates.

At the other end of the life cycle, death certificates are rarely issued. No national data exists on the percentage of deaths that are formally documented. A limited 2016 study by PUSKAPA across three subdistricts in Aceh, Central Java, and South Sulawesi found that only 11.5% of respondents would definitely apply for a death certificate if a death occurred in their family. Other important civil registration documents include national identity cards (KTP), family cards (KK), and certificates of marriage and divorce.

Barriers to access go a long way to explaining why citizens may not possess civil registration documents, but a lack of demand for them is also part of the problem (see Table 5).

A research by PUSKAPA (2020) revealed that the second most common reason for not possessing a KTP was that the respondent could not see the purpose of having one. However, in aggregate, barriers to access – including time, distance, lack of knowledge and expense – are more common reasons for not possessing a KTP.


In 2019, Indonesia launched an ambitious National CRVS Strategy (with KOMPAK support) that aims for universal coverage of birth, marriage, divorce and death certificates by 2024 (see Box 2). The strategy also sets a target for 99% of citizens to be issued with a Single Identification Number (NIK) by 2024. This unique identifying number facilitates the linking of citizen data across different government databases – for example, socio-economic status for the purpose of eligibility to access a social protection program.

But much of the low hanging fruit has already been picked. Citizens still without birth certificates and other civil registration documents are likely to be from harder to reach sections of the community. The challenge in places like Papua is particularly acute. Registering the births of all under 18s within four years, assuming a starting point of 45.9 per cent, will be extremely difficult.

The operating environment is also complex. Ultimate authority over civil registration policy and practice lies with the Directorate-General of Population Administration and Civil Registration under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA). However, at least ten other sectors—including health, education, social protection, religious affairs, foreign affairs, the police, the judicial system, labour and immigration—also have responsibility for various aspects of the civil registration process. And it is the district/municipal level of government that is responsible for actually delivering the bulk of civil registration services. Fragmentation of policy is common within MoHA itself, between MoHA and other sectors, and between levels of government.

Table 5

Reason for not possessing a national identity card (KTP)



Source: PUSKAPA (2020)

Box 2

Reason for not possessing a national identity card (KTP)

	Baseline (SUSENAS 2017)	Target (2024)
Single Identification Number (NIK)		
<5	85.8%	99%
<18	92.9%	99%
All	96.0%	99%
Birth certificates		
<5	75.4%	100%
<18	83.3%	100%
Marriage certificates	No national data	100%
Divorce certificates	No national data	100%
Death certificates (in last year)	No national data	100%

KOMPAK supports Indonesia’s work on civil registration because of the scale of the challenge and the potential payoff that success may bring. As outlined above, the benefits of broader civil registration coverage include facilitating access to government services for citizens, while providing government with better data to plan the provision of those (and other) services. To this end, KOMPAK partners with government at all levels – national, provincial, district, subdistrict and village – to jointly analyse problems and test approaches to solving them. This paper highlights one specific element of this work: village-based facilitation of access to civil registration services, funded and managed by villages themselves.

2. Village-based CRVS services

KOMPAK’s work on CRVS has evolved over time through a process of experimentation and learning. It departs from the premise that the most strategic way of improving civil registration coverage is to ensure that every citizen receives legal identity from birth.

Initially, KOMPAK worked with district civil registration offices (particularly in Aceh and NTB) to build understanding of why there were gaps in civil registration coverage and develop strategies for closing them. Four different approaches emerged, all aimed at bringing CRVS services closer to communities. Two were linked to sectors (termed ‘acceleration’) and two were based on geography (termed ‘outreach’):

Sectoral (acceleration) Provision of CRVS services through	Geographic (outreach) Provision of CRVS services through
<p>Health: At birth and during early childhood at health service facilities.</p> <p>Education: At schools during the annual intake of new primary and secondary students.</p>	<p>Subdistricts: Tasking social welfare workers (TKSK) based at the subdistrict office.</p> <p>Villages: Training civil registration facilitators based at the village level.</p>

Over time, the village-based approach gained the most traction with local governments. In general, it was felt to be more suited to providing services on an ongoing basis, rather than at a particular point in time (for example, the beginning of a school year). It also has the potential to reach particularly marginalised populations who may not be engaged with the health or education systems.

The village-based approach involves active outreach by trained facilitators to identify community members who have experienced civil registration events (for example, a birth, death or marriage). Facilitators then assist community members to complete and provide the documents necessary to register the event. Facilitators take completed applications to civil registration offices in bulk and, once processed, deliver civil registration documents to applicants.

In theory, this model directly addresses key disparities and barriers to access by:

- Targeting rural areas where civil registration rates tend to be lower (villages are by definition rural, even though not all are far from urban centres).
- Reducing barriers to access that are often greater in rural areas (for example, time and cost of travelling to a civil registration office located in a district capital).
- Reaching all sections of the community (not just children) and operating continuously (rather than being linked to particular events).

- Mitigating some of the challenges involved in cross-sectoral coordination (for example, between civil registration and the health and/or education sectors).

Unsurprisingly, given its inherent potential benefits, the idea of providing civil registration services at the village level is not new. Since the enactment of Indonesia's current Civil Registration Law in 2006, local governments have been able to appoint civil registration officers (*petugas registrasi*) at the village level to assist with the recording and management of basic population data and to facilitate access to civil registration documents.

The challenge has been finding an affordable implementation modality that local governments are willing and able to adopt.

2.1. Current government policy

Under the existing model, district governments bear the cost of employing civil registration officers.

This is an inevitable consequence of the modality by which they must be employed. According to the Civil Registration Law, priority must be given to those who are already permanent civil servants. Where that is not possible, civil registration officers may be engaged on a contract basis (*pegawai pemerintah dengan perjanjian kerja* or PPPK) pursuant to the 2014 Civil Service Law. Villages do not have the authority to employ staff through either of these modalities.

Civil registration officers are to be appointed by the district head, upon the recommendation of the relevant village head (conveyed via the head of the district civil registration office). Criteria for appointment include completion of senior high school (or equivalent) and appropriate training in civil registration. Once appointed, civil registration officers are functionally accountable to the head of the district civil registration office, but operationally accountable to the village head. They should ordinarily be resident in the village where they provide services.

Unfortunately, no centralised data exists on the extent to which districts are employing this approach in practice. What is known is that village-based civil registration officers have not been appointed in any of the 40 districts in six provinces where KOMPAK works. On this basis, it seems reasonable to assume that implementation is patchy at best. The question, therefore, is why? Logically, there are two possible answers.

First, it could be that the model is not being implemented because it has proved ineffective at increasing rates of civil registration coverage. However, that assumes its effectiveness has already been tested. Little evidence exists to support this position, at least in KOMPAK-supported locations.

Second – and more likely – local government interest in improving civil registration coverage does not exceed the cost of doing so (perceived or actual) under this model. Even if local governments have calculated the costs of implementing the model, any sort of cost/benefit analysis is difficult in the absence of credible data on the magnitude of its potential benefits. The cost of inaction is also low, in the absence of significant penalties (or rewards) from the central government.

2.2. The FPLKD model

The regular model (in referring to the current government policy) and FPLKD model has the same objective and approach, but with different modality. Like the The regular model (in referring to the current government policy) and FPLKD model has the same objective and approach, but with different modality. model, it aims to increase rates of civil registration coverage by making access to civil registration documents quicker, cheaper and easier. Its strategy for doing so is village-based civil registration facilitators who, for the most part, are functionally equivalent to the civil registration officers of the The regular model (in referring to the current government policy) and FPLKD model has the same objective and approach, but with different modality. model (see Box 3). The main points of difference relate to funding and management arrangements.


Under the FPLKD model, Village-based CRVS Facilitator are funded and managed by villages themselves, rather than districts. Villages have long been responsible for some basic civil registration functions, such as reporting the number of citizens in the village and providing letters certifying identity or status for community members wanting to obtain civil registration documents. The FPLKD model simply enlarges the role of villages in this area to include more active facilitation of access to civil registration and population administration services.

Four things are required for villages to get the model up and running: authority, budget, human resources, and training. Authority comes through two executive orders of the district head – one to delegate authority from the district to villages to undertake this role, and another to provide villages with the authority to allocate budget for this purpose. Villages then allocate funds from their village budget and select facilitators. Training of facilitators is generally undertaken in cooperation with the district civil registration office.

The Village-based CRVS Facilitator Model is combined with procedural reforms at civil registration offices. These are designed to make the registration process more efficient for both village facilitators processing civil registration applications in bulk as well as for members of the general public.

Importantly, the FPLKD model comprises a set of principles and approaches that can be adapted

to local conditions, rather than a one-size-fits-all approach to be applied inflexibly everywhere. After initially growing organically from KOMPAK's work in Aceh and NTB, the idea has subsequently been introduced to other provinces and districts, where it has continued to develop in accordance with local conditions and preferences. Some of the most common variations to the model include whether village civil registration facilitators are drawn from existing village government officials or recruited specifically for that purpose, together with the way in which they are remunerated (for example, a fixed monthly fee, a fee



per service, or some combination of the two).

Interestingly, in practice, provincial and district governments do not always draw a clear distinction between the FPLKD and the regular models. Some have viewed the FPLKD model as simply a more affordable way of funding the government model, rather than a distinct model in itself – which is, in many ways, correct. For example, the Governor of Aceh Instruction (No.6/2018) that established the initial legal basis for village-based civil registration in Aceh mandates that village-based civil registration officers (under the FPLKD model) be recruited pursuant to the procedures set out in Minister of Home Affairs Regulation (No.199/2017) governing the appointment and removal of village civil registration officers (the government model). This is notwithstanding that the funding and employment modalities under the two models are completely different.

2.3. Other alternative models

While the focus of KOMPAK’s programming (and this paper) is village-based civil registration services, credible policy alternatives do exist that also address the barrier of cost of obtaining civil registration documents and, to a lesser degree, the barriers of time and complexity. They are:

1. Mobile services where civil registry officials visit villages to provide civil registration services.
2. Online services where citizens can submit applications for civil registration documents electronically.
3. Creation of service delivery points at the subdistrict level, including delegation of certain tasks to subdistrict government officials.

All are operational at the district level to varying degrees. Ideally, an analysis of village-based civil registration services would also consider these alternatives. Doing so, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.

3. Learning priorities: Three key questions

Village-based CRVS Facilitator Model have much to recommend them in theory – but what about in practice? KOMPAK’s learning priorities for its work on civil registration can be summed up in three key questions, centred around themes of effectiveness, efficiency, and incentives.

Q1: Effectiveness – Do Village-based CRVS Facilitator Model services work?

Can village-based civil registration services help increase the number of citizens who possess civil registration documents? Whom do they help the most?

This is the threshold question for KOMPAK (and government) to answer. Conveniently, it applies equally to both the FPLKD and regular models, given that from a citizen’s perspective, the service experience from both should be roughly equivalent.

The first step is to assess whether and to what extent village-based civil registration services remove barriers

to access by making the application process quicker, cheaper and/or easier. If they do, the question then becomes whether that also results in more people obtaining civil registration documents. This requires trying to distinguish between those who:

- (i) Would not have obtained civil registration documents within a defined timeframe without the availability of village-based civil registration services.
- (ii) Would have obtained civil registration documents within a defined timeframe regardless, but enjoyed a quicker, easier and/or cheaper experience under the FPLKD model.

Q2: Efficiency – What is the best way to implement them?

If the Village-based CRVS Facilitator Model of service provision is effective, what is the most cost-efficient and practical way of implementing it at scale?

For now, two alternatives exist: the regular model of village-based civil registration officers, paid for by district governments, and the FPLKD model of village-based civil registration facilitators, funded by villages. Comparing the overall cost to government of each approach is a good place to start. Does the FPLKD model result in cost savings or just cost shifting?

Also of interest are the relative advantages and disadvantages of village-based or district-based funding and management arrangements (or a combination of the two). Districts may have a natural inclination to shift costs and management authority to villages. The principle that funds should follow function also supports this approach, but are there any unintended consequences?

At a practical level, what types of operational lessons can be drawn from KOMPAK's experience? What type of person should be selected as a facilitator? What is the minimum necessary knowledge they require to perform their role effectively? Finally, how are they best incentivised to do so?

Q3: Incentives – Why would governments want to do it?

What incentivises governments to pursue greater civil registration coverage? How could incentives be better structured so that interest in that outcome exceeds the cost of achieving it?

The FPLKD model of using village funds to pay for Village-based CRVS Facilitator Model is primarily a solution to the problem of district governments being unwilling or unable to fund it themselves. However, all governments are resource-constrained, so 'not enough money' is better understood as 'not a high enough priority to fund'. If this is true, what incentivises governments to provide adequate technical support to a village-funded model? Likewise, will villages fund civil registration services because they want to, or only because a district government tells them that they have to?

4. FPLKD: A snapshot of implementation so far

Examining the effectiveness or efficiency of the FPLKD model for Village-based CRVS Facilitator Model requires that it first be implemented in practice. This initial step towards achieving desired intermediate and higher-level outcomes has been the primary focus of KOMPAK's work to date.

KOMPAK does not implement directly itself; instead, KOMPAK works with government to build understanding of problems and think through possible solutions. Government then implements and tests those solutions, primarily with its own resources. Operating in this way magnifies the impact of KOMPAK's work and ensures that only approaches that can be implemented through government systems are supported, increasing the likelihood of sustainability.

Sketching the timeline and scale of implementation to date provides guidance on what type of results it makes sense to look for – and where – at this point in time. For example, if the model has been implemented only in several subdistricts in a district, unless the expected impact is overwhelming it would not be reasonable to expect an observable change through data aggregated at the district level. However, it would make sense to look for changes in those subdistricts.

Finally, it is worth bearing in mind that simply getting the model off the ground in almost all KOMPAK-supported locations is an achievement in its own right. In sum, it requires district and village governments to enact regulations, allocate budget, establish systems and procedures, and train facilitators. That they are willing to do so – and in some cases at scale – is testament to the effectiveness of KOMPAK's engagement strategy.

4.1. Since when, where, and at what scale?

The FPLKD model was pioneered in Aceh (early 2018) and NTB (early 2019) and has since expanded to all KOMPAK-supported provinces except Papua. Initial meetings to discuss the adoption of the FPLKD model in Papua were paused in October 2020, due to the need for district governments to focus their attention on COVID-19.

With the exception of South Sulawesi (and in future Papua Barat), KOMPAK is, on average, supporting village-based CRVS facilitator model in approximately 10% of villages in a district. Where this is the case, it makes sense to look for results at the subdistrict rather than district level. In South Sulawesi, the two KOMPAK-supported districts (Pangkajene Kepulauan and Bantaeng) decided to go straight to 100% coverage without a pilot. In Aceh, Bener Meriah, and West Aceh districts have also gone to 100% coverage since approximately August 2018.

Generally speaking, the majority of villages in KOMPAK-supported subdistricts are applying the FPLKD model. For example, as at March 2021, approximately 75% of villages in KOMPAK-supported subdistricts in East Lombok and North Lombok were actively implementing village-based civil registration services.

Table 6

Map of KOMPAK locations




Table 7

Initial target locations for village-based civil registration activities

Province	Districts	Subdistricts		Villages		Start date (approx.)	Replication (in district)
		number	proportion	number	proportion		
Aceh	West Aceh	1 of 12	8%	27 of 322	8%	early 2018	High
	Bener Meriah	1 of 10	10%	35 of 233	15%	early 2018	High
	Bireuen	1 of 17	6%	41 of 609	7%	early 2018	Low
	Subtotal/average	3 of 39	8%	103 of 1,164	9%		
Central Java	Brebes	1 of 17	6%	12 of 297	4%	late 2019	None
	Pekalongan	1 of 19	5%	9 of 272	3%	late 2019	None
	Pemalang	1 of 14	7%	12 of 222	5%	late 2019	None
	Subtotal/average	3 of 50	6%	33 of 791	4%		
East Java	Bondowoso	2 of 23	9%	28 of 219	13%	mid 2019	Medium
	Lumajang	2 of 21	10%	20 of 205	10%	N/A	None
	Pacitan	2 of 12	17%	27 of 171	16%	mid 2019	High
	Trenggalek	2 of 14	14%	20 of 157	13%	N/A	None
	Subtotal/average	8 of 70	11%	95 of 752	13%		
South Sulawesi	Bantaeng	8 of 8	100%	67 of 67	100%	mid 2019	High
	Pangkep	13 of 13	100%	103 of 103	100%	mid 2019	High
	Subtotal/average	21 of 21	100%	170 of 170	100%		

Province	Districts	Subdistricts		Villages		Start date (approx.)	Replication (in district)
		number	proportion	number	proportion		
NTB	Bima	2 of 18	11%	29 of 192	15%	early 2019	Low
	East Lombok	3 of 21	14%	40 of 254	16%	early 2019	None
	North Lombok	2 of 5	40%	13 of 33	39%	early 2019	Medium
	Sumbawa	2 of 24	8%	20 of 165	12%	late 2018	Medium
	Subtotal/average	9 of 68	13%	102 of 644	16%		
TOTAL	16	44 of 248	18%	503 of 3,521	14%		
Papua	Asmat	2 of 23	9%	23 of 221	10%	N/A	N/A
	Boven Digoel	2 of 20	10%	9 of 112	8%	N/A	N/A
	Jayapura	2 of 19	11%	14 of 144	10%	N/A	N/A
	Nabire	2 of 15	13%	10 of 89	11%	N/A	N/A
	Subtotal/average	8 of 77	10%	56 of 566	10%		
Papua Barat	Fakfak	2 of 17	12%	18 of 149	12%	Planned 2021	All villages through PROSPPEK (in future)
	Kaimana	1 of 7	14%	19 of 86	22%		
	Manokwari Selatan	3 of 6	50%	34 of 57	60%		
	Sorong	2 of 30	7%	24 of 257	9%		
	Subtotal/average	8 of 60	13%	95 of 549	17%		

Note: ‘Replication (in district)’ describes the extent to which FPLKD is being applied in non-KOMPAK-supported subdistricts within a district, based on the estimation of KOMPAK’s provincial teams. The estimated percentage of villages applying FPLKD is categorised as ‘high’ (76%–100%), ‘medium’ (26%–75%), ‘low’ (1%–25%) and ‘none’ (0%). However, these categories should be considered rough guides only, due to the challenges of monitoring and verification in areas where KOMPAK does not have a direct presence.

Some replication of the FPLKD approach is also taking place outside of KOMPAK-supported subdistricts and districts, although generally at small scale. A notable exception is Aceh, where the provincial civil registry office’s enthusiasm for the FPLKD model has seen it incrementally expanded to an additional 10 districts since 2019. By December 2020, village CRVS facilitators had reportedly been trained in all villages in Langsa, Aceh Jaya, Southwest Aceh, Aceh Tamiang, Simeuleu, and East Aceh Districts, approximately 90% of villages in South Aceh and Pidie Jaya Districts, and less than 5% of villages in North Aceh and Aceh Besar Districts. In total, this comprises 3,027 village CRVS facilitators in 2,459 villages.

However, the absence of any meaningful quantitative or qualitative data means that the extent to which the model is actually operating outside of KOMPAK-supported subdistricts and districts is largely unknown. One indication of relatively weak implementation in non-KOMPAK-supported districts in Aceh comes from the inactivity of WhatsApp groups set up to encourage communication amongst facilitators in these districts.

4.2. Operational highlights and challenges

Allocation of budget is one of the ultimate expressions of any government's policy commitment. Pleasingly, district civil registry offices in most KOMPAK-supported locations have allocated staff time and budget to help train village CRVS facilitators. Likewise, a significant number of villages have allocated village funds towards the stipends and operational costs of these facilitators.

Limited KOMPAK survey data from Aceh also indicates high levels of community satisfaction with FPLKD model. Over 97% of respondents in Bener Meriah, Bireuen and West Aceh were pleased with this method of service provision.

Despite KOMPAK's relative success in working with district governments to roll out the village-based civil registration model, naturally it has also faced some operational challenges. Common problems at the village level, identified through routine monitoring in Bener Meriah, Bireuen, and West Aceh, include:

- Not all villages making budget allocations for FPLKD.
- Village CRVS facilitators not being able to access funds allocated for civil registration activities from the village budget, causing them to be less motivated to carry out those activities.
- Funds allocated for FPLKD in the village budget not being expended because facilitators were not properly trained, with the funds subsequently being reallocated to other activities.

Similar problems in relation to village budget allocations for CRVS facilitator salaries and travel allowances were also identified by PUSKAPA in NTB and South Sulawesi.

Village politics has also affected on the implementation of FPLKD in Aceh. It is not uncommon for village heads to use appointments to income-generating positions to reward their supporters. In Aceh at least, the appointment of village CRVS facilitators has seemingly not been immune to this trend. After village head elections in KOMPAK-supported districts, approximately 50–70% of existing village CRVS facilitators were dismissed and replaced with appointees selected by the new village head. This reduces the return on investment of training of the original appointees, while the new appointees only receiving informal guidance from civil registry officials on how to carry out their duties. As a partial solution to this problem, the Governor of Aceh subsequently issued a regulation requiring village CRVS facilitators to be appointed for a minimum of two years.

Box 4

A happy customer

Alhamdulillah, having CRVS facilitators in Timang Gajah is very helpful for the community. We don't need to go to the district capital to arrange documents ourselves. All we have to do is provide all of the necessary information.

If we had to arrange everything ourselves, it would take quite a long time, going back and forth to the district capital to satisfy all the requirements. It would take time, energy and money to arrange civil registration documents. Having CRVS facilitators in our village is really helpful.

Community member, Kampung Timah Gajah, Bener Meriah, November 2018

The implementation of reforms at district civil registry offices has also been mixed.

As at December 2018, all civil registry offices in the three KOMPAK-supported districts in Aceh had established fast-track systems to expedite the processing of documents applied for through FPLKD. In Bireuen, fast-track was only available for birth and death certificates – applications for other civil registration documents had to be made through the regular queue. Civil registry staff reportedly check applications immediately for completeness and inform village facilitators of any missing information or supporting documents.

Meanwhile, fast-track systems in Bener Meriah and West Aceh were reportedly understaffed compared with the number of documents being applied for, leading to significant wait times. This was compounded in Bener Meriah by poor communication between civil registry staff and village facilitators, meaning that facilitators didn't know when documents were ready for pick-up. Numerous instances were identified of facilitators arriving to collect documents that were not ready, and without indication of when they would be.

Implementation of other KOMPAK-supported efforts to improve service quality at civil registry offices has been much more limited. As at December 2018, these reforms had been partially implemented in Bener Meriah, but not at all in Bireuen and West Aceh. In West Aceh, the head of the civil registry office acknowledged that physical and human resources were not a significant obstacle, yet more on the lack of interest and commitment.

PUSKAPA's 2020 study identified similar issues in other KOMPAK locations. In South Sulawesi, civil registry offices had not established a fast-track system to enable expedited processing of documents applied for through FPLKD. In Bima, a fast-track system had been established, but many village facilitators were unable to use it as they were not recognised as such by civil registry staff. Meanwhile, in South Sulawesi, a lack of community awareness of FPLKD sometimes resulted in community members being reluctant to use village facilitators, whom they instead mistook for informal brokers.

Box 5

Village-based CRVS – a Civil Registry perspective

When village CRVS facilitators were introduced, we received so many applications that in the beginning they were all just piling up. But after we made service improvements by allocating specific staff and adding computer operators to input data, all the documents applied for by CRVS facilitators have been finalised...

In the beginning we could receive 100 applications per day, which might take a month to process. Now we receive 50 applications per week from CRVS facilitators and can process them in two days.

One of the difficulties we face is that there are many pending applications because CRVS facilitators haven't completed them properly. So, for example, when there are problems with a statutory declaration we usually provide feedback direct to the facilitator.

Another problem is that we don't have a robust monitoring system to track the number of documents applied for by CRVS facilitators. So we don't actually know the exact number of documents they've helped to process.


FGD participant from West Aceh Civil Registry Office, November 2018

5. Effectiveness: What do we know so far?

Thinking about effectiveness first requires identifying desired outcomes against which effectiveness can be measured. These are captured in the basic theory of change animating KOMPAK's work on village-based civil registration (see Table 8). Desired outcomes are shown in green, linked by thick arrows. Other possible outcomes are shown in orange and red, linked by thin arrows.

Table 8

A basic theory of change for village-based civil registration services



A few caveats (explaining alternative outcomes)

While improvements in the time, cost and/or ease of obtaining civil registration documents should result in an increase in civil registration rates, this will only occur when:

- (i) **The improvements remove barriers to access that would otherwise have prevented or sufficiently disincentivised citizens from obtaining civil registration documents.** If the improvements are not sufficient to remove barriers or disincentives to access, the result will simply be a better experience for those who would nevertheless have obtained civil registration documents without the intervention.
- (ii) **An incentive exists to obtain civil registration documents even if the cost (financial and otherwise) is reduced to zero.** Without at least some incentive for citizens to obtain civil registration documents, even reducing the cost to zero may not be enough to prompt action by those who would not otherwise have bothered or been able to obtain them. Recalling PUSKAPA's 2020 survey finding that the second most common reason for a respondent not having a KTP was that they couldn't see the point in having one, this remains a live issue.

An increase in registration rates might also be observed even though the intervention fails to improve the time, cost and/or ease of obtaining civil registration documents. This could result if the intervention somehow succeeds in channelling more people through existing systems without making meaningful improvements to them.

5.1. The data challenge: What can we find out and how?

Improvements in time, cost and/or ease of obtaining CRVS documents

The first step is to try to ascertain whether the FPLKD model does actually make obtaining CRVS documents quicker, cheaper, and/or easier, as intended. Knowing that it does (or doesn't) can provide insight into whether it could be the mechanism driving any observed changes (or not) in civil registration rates. There are two main ways to go about doing this – directly and indirectly.

Direct measurement involves quantifying the extent to which FPLKD makes obtaining civil registration documents quicker, cheaper, and/or easier than a citizen doing it themselves. Some indicative data on the cost of both alternatives can be found in the 2020 PUSKAPA study and 2018 monitoring reports from the Aceh provincial team. However, because most costs are related to transport, which are in turn influenced by the distance of a village from a district capital, they can vary significantly by location.

Time to obtain a CRVS document requires distinguishing between time spent to obtain the document and time elapsed from the beginning to the end of the process. 'Time spent' is better thought of as an opportunity cost, whereas 'time elapsed' is more a measure of convenience. The limited existing data on time (again from the 2020 PUSKAPA study and 2018 Aceh monitoring reports) generally only measures the latter, and then only from the time of receipt by the civil registry office.

Ease of obtaining CRVS documents can be measured either subjectively (based simply on a person's opinion) or objectively (by reference to certain criteria). The very limited existing data on ease of use is based primarily on subjective assessments. There is nothing wrong with relying on subjective assessments – in many respects, they are what matter the most, but they do not necessarily indicate what is easier or why.

Indirect measurement involves determining the proportion of citizens using FPLKD and using that as a proxy for the extent to which it makes civil registration quicker, cheaper, and/or easier. The greater the percentage of citizens using FPLKD when it is available in their village, the stronger the indication that it is more attractive than the alternatives. Conversely, the smaller percentage, the weaker the indication. This assumes, of course, that FPLKD is operating in a village and that its capacity to supply services is not the limiting factor.

The problem with the indirect method is disentangling whether cost, time or ease of use is the primary driver of a preference towards FPLKD. All it indicates is relative attractiveness compared with other alternatives, not why. That relative attractiveness could also be based on a misperception of the benefits of FPLKD (or lack thereof). The benefit, however, is that it can provide a reasonable indication of the extent to which FPLKD is removing barriers accessing civil registration services at much less cost than a survey or interviews. Unfortunately, this benefit has been only partially realised due to the difficulty of obtaining necessary data in most districts.

Changes in civil registration rates

The most accurate way to isolate and measure the impact of the FPLKD model on changes in civil registration rates would be a randomised controlled trial (RCT). However, KOMPAK is not set up to do RCTs, and in any event, an RCT – with its dependence on rigid implementation protocols – would arguably not be appropriate at a point where the village-based civil registration model is still evolving.

Another way to gain insight into the contribution of FPLKD to any changes in civil registration rates might have been to exploit the way in which FPLKD has been rolled out, which in many ways resembles a natural experiment. Except in South Sulawesi (and to a lesser extent Aceh), FPLKD has been rolled out in only a small number of subdistricts within a district. Subject to a number of assumptions being met (and not all of which necessarily would have been met), it may have been possible to employ a ‘difference in differences’ approach to compare changes in registration rates in these ‘treatment’ subdistricts with changes in ‘control’ subdistricts where FPLKD had not yet been implemented. However, obtaining sufficient data to pursue this further proved too difficult.

Some indication of whether FPLKD is contributing to higher civil registration rates might also have been gleaned from an understanding of who is using its services. It may be, for example, that FPLKD is assisting a significant number of adults to obtain birth certificates. Without any other obvious trigger for them to obtain a birth certificate (unlike a child being enrolled in school), it would be reasonable to assume that FPLKD has in many cases helped facilitate civil registration for those who would not otherwise have done so. That would contribute to an increase in civil registration rates. Again, however, a lack of data on the age or other characteristics of those obtaining CRVS documents through FPLKD (or the difficulty of obtaining it) has been an insurmountable obstacle.

A final (albeit imperfect) option is to again rely on measuring the proportion of civil registration documents being issued through FPLKD. If no or very few civil registration documents are facilitated by FPLKD and yet civil registration coverage rates increase, that is unlikely to have been caused by FPLKD. Conversely, if all or almost all CRVS documents are facilitated by FPLKD and coverage rates increase, a more plausible relationship exists between those two events. Unfortunately, in between those two extremes – when a moderate percentage of documents are facilitated by FPLKD, and coverage rates increase – drawing conclusions is more difficult. It is impossible to know whether the documents responsible for increasing the coverage rate came from FPLKD or elsewhere. Again, with the exception of two subdistricts in Sumbawa, obtaining the necessary data to apply this methodology proved difficult, because civil registry offices do not generally record whether a document has been issued through the FPLKD channel or not.

In sum, the lack of appropriate data makes it impossible to quantify the extent to which FPLKD has contributed to increasing registration rates by assisting people obtaining CRVS documents who would not otherwise have obtained them. There are undoubtedly individuals assisted by FPLKD for whom this is the case, but there is currently no way to measure this with any accuracy.

Improved access to services for citizens and better data for government

The extent to which possession of civil registration documents improves access to government services for citizens is an important question – but one that can be answered without reference to FPLKD. Logically, how a citizen obtains a civil registration document should not be determinative of the value they derive from it. Even if FPLKD disproportionately assists those who would benefit most from easier access to government services through possessing civil registration documents, once those citizens are registered, they are in no different position (analytically) to citizens who obtained their civil registration documents by other means. For this reason, and in the absence of relevant data, this paper does not examine results at this level.

Similarly, how a person obtains a civil registration document is not determinative of the value government derives from more citizens being registered. Again, even if FPLKD disproportionately assists those who would benefit most from social welfare programs, how government uses civil registration data to target those programs is a separate question. Accordingly, and again in the absence of relevant data, this paper does not examine results at this level.


5.2. By how much does FPLKD lower the cost of access to civil registration?

KOMPAK’s provincial team in Aceh conducted a limited survey to directly measure the costs incurred by citizens when applying for a CRVS document independently and through FPLKD (see Table 9). The survey was fielded in six villages in West Aceh, nine villages in Bener Meriah, and five villages in Bireuen, in December 2018. Five respondents who had used FPLKD were surveyed in each village.

This limited survey indicates that FPLKD was successful in reducing the cost of applying for a CRVS document to zero for almost all those surveyed (see Table 10). Note, however, that the scale of the savings differs significantly by district. For example, in West Aceh and Bireuen, 84% and 70% of respondents (respectively) spent IDR 100,000 or more to apply for a CRVS document independently, whereas only 20% of respondents in Bener Meriah spent that much. Geography (distance of the surveyed villages to the district capital) helps to explain much of the discrepancy.

Table 9


Cost of processing CRVS document independently (Aceh)



Source: Aceh Provincial Team Survey (December 2018)

Table 10

Cost of processing CRVS document via FPLKD (Aceh)




Source: Aceh Provincial Team Survey (December 2018)

Although no data exists on FPLKD cost savings in other provinces, a rough estimate can be derived from data on the cost of applying for civil registration documents independently. Table 11 presents data from the 2020 PUSKAPA survey on the percentage of respondents who spent more than IDR 50,000 to obtain a birth certificate. Assuming that, as in Aceh, FPLKD reduces the cost to applicants to almost zero, the saving generated by FPLKD is at least IDR 50,000 for the percentage of respondents in each province that spent more than that amount (for example, approximately 75% of respondents in Central Java, but less than 30% of respondents in South Sulawesi).

Table 11

Total cost of obtaining a birth certificate exceeds IDR 50,000



Province	District	Sample size
Aceh	West Aceh	n = 222
	Bener Meriah	
Central Java	Pekalongan	n = 241
	Pemalang	
East Java	Bondowoso	n = 135
	Pacitan	
NTB	East Lombok	n = 246
	Bima	
South Sulawesi	Bantaeng	n = 257
	Pangkep	

Source: PUSKAPA (2020)

Note that none of the costs above account for the value of time. If value were attributed to time, the savings would tend to be greater. How much greater depends on the opportunity cost a citizen incurs in obtaining a civil registration document – in other words, what they could have done in that time instead. Ironically, the opportunity cost for those with low or no income – and for whom FPLKD may be of most value – will appear smaller than for those with higher incomes. Caution is therefore warranted in including the value of time in any analysis of where FPLKD could be most usefully deployed.

5.3. Data by district


Sumbawa

FPLKD has facilitated a steadily increasing proportion of civil registration documents in the two KOMPAK-supported subdistricts in Sumbawa (see Table 12). Since commencing implementation in late 2018, the figure has increased from approximately 10% to approximately 30%. Note that these figures only

count documents facilitated from start to finish by FPLKD, and don't count people who were assisted by a CRVS facilitator to fill in forms and gather documents, but then went to the civil registry office themselves to speed up the process.

Table 12

**Percentage of CRVS documents processed via FPLKD
Plampang and Utan Subdistricts, Sumbawa District (2018–2020)**




Source: Sumbawa Civil Registry Office

An increasing proportion of civil registration documents facilitated by FPLKD indicates citizens growing preference for this mode of service delivery. However, considering that in 2020 roughly 70% still preferred alternative service delivery channels, it would be interesting to know why. If the cost of using FPLKD is effectively zero, is it because there are also other low-cost options? Alternatively, are time and convenience the main drivers?

Table 13


**Birth certificates processed via FPLKD compared to coverage rate
Plampang and Utan Subdistricts Sumbawa District (2018–2020)**



Source: Sumbawa Civil Registry Office

Table 14

**ID cards processed via FPLKD compared to coverage rate
Plampang and Utan Subdistricts, Sumbawa District (2018–2020)**




Source: Sumbawa Civil Registry Office

As the proportion of birth certificates and ID cards facilitated by FPLKD in Plampang and Utan has grown, so too have rates of possession of those documents continued to rise (see Tables 13 and 14).

On existing data, it is not possible to draw a conclusive causal relationship between those two trends. Nevertheless, it seems plausible that when FPLKD is facilitating approximately 30% of birth certificates in a subdistrict, it is making at least some contribution to increasing rates of birth certificate possession.

Table 15
Family Cards processed via FPLKD compared to coverage rate Plampang and Utan Subdistricts, Sumbawa District (2018–2020)



Source: Sumbawa Civil Registry Office

However, in the absence of data on who FPLKD is assisting the most, making assumptions about the scale of that contribution – whether marginal or significant – remains an analytical step too far.


Table 15 shows that FPLKD could not have contributed to increasing the rate of possession of family cards in the two KOMPAK-supported subdistricts in Sumbawa, which was already at 100%. At best, FPLKD may have helped ensure the coverage rate did not fall. However, the steadily increasing percentage of family cards facilitated by FPLKD suggest that it is likely providing users with a better experience – either quicker, cheaper, easier, or some combination of the three – and that citizens are voting with their feet.

East Lombok

Limited data from East Lombok indicates that citizens used FPLKD most to apply for ID cards (see Table 16). However, this finding should be interpreted with caution for two reasons. First, the data is drawn from only a five-month period. Second, the data is drawn only from the BAKSO online application system and does not count documents that were applied for manually. The proportion of documents applied for through each channel is unknown. Another factor that explains the seemingly negligible use of FPLKD to facilitate applications for family cards (KK) is that citizens can now obtain them at the civil registry service unit in the subdistrict capital, rather than the civil registry office in the district capital, rendering the service offered by FPLKD relatively less appealing than it might otherwise be.

Table 16

Percentage of documents processed via FPLKD Terara, Lenek and Aikmel Subdistrict, East Lombok District (Nov 2020–Mar 2021)




Source: Sumbawa Civil Registry Office

Bondowoso

In Bondowoso, FPLKD has consistently facilitated a greater percentage of birth certificates than other civil registration documents (see Table 17). The percentage of birth certificates facilitated by FPLKD has never been less than 30%, and usually significantly more. In contrast, a maximum 23% of family cards and 16% of ID cards have been facilitated by FPLKD.

Table 17

**Percentage of CRVS documents processed via FPLKD
Cermee and Wringin Subdistricts, Bondowoso District (Jul 2019–Dec 2020)**



Source: Bondowoso Civil Registry Office and KOMPAK Survey

The differing trajectories of birth certificates facilitated by FPLKD in Cermee and Wringin are not easily explained. However, after significant variation between the two subdistricts in the first year of FPLKD, the percentage of birth certificates facilitated by FPLKD in the second half of 2020 was close to converging. If the data is correct and 64–74% of birth certificates issued were facilitated by FPLKD, that means a very sizeable proportion of citizens are preferring FPLKD to other avenues for obtaining birth certificates, presumably by virtue of it being considered cheaper, quicker and/or easier. Finding out which of those is the main driver would be very useful to know.


Aceh, South Sulawesi and Central Java

It has not been possible to calculate the percentage of CRVS documents facilitated by FPLKD in Aceh, South Sulawesi, and Central Java. This is due to difficulties in obtaining civil registry data on the total number of CRVS documents issued in subdistricts for which KOMPAK survey data exists.

However, patterns in the KOMPAK survey data for birth certificates facilitated by FPLKD are notably consistent amongst the three KOMPAK-supported districts in Aceh and the two KOMPAK-supported districts in South Sulawesi (see Tables 18 and 19). Numbers start high, drop significantly during the period January–June 2020, and then climb again, but not to their initial highs. They then plateau or even start to decline again slightly. The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic during the first half of 2020 may explain the sudden drop in the number of birth certificates facilitated in that period. Meanwhile, numbers starting to stabilise at a lower point than when FPLKD was first rolled out may suggest that most citizens without birth certificates now have them, and ongoing demand is beginning to be driven more by new births than people who have missed out on birth certificates in the past. Further research would be necessary to determine whether or not this is actually the case.


Numbers of family cards and ID cards facilitated by FPLKD are more varied and patterns are harder to identify. In Bireuen and West Aceh, numbers of these documents facilitated by FPLKD have generally been decreasing over time. In Bantaeng and Pangkep, numbers of family cards are either roughly steady or increasing slightly, while numbers of ID cards facilitated demonstrate opposing trends.

Table 18
Number of CRVS documents processed via FPLKD
West Aceh, Bener Meriah, and Bireuen Districts (Jul 2019–Dec 2020)



Source: KOMPAK Survey

Table 19
Number of CRVS documents processed via FPLKD
Bantaeng and Pangkep Districts, South Sulawesi (Jul 2019–Dec 2020)




Source: KOMPAK Survey

Patterns in the survey data for the three KOMPAK-supported districts in Central Java are slightly different (see Table 20). For birth certificates facilitated by FPLKD, Brebes follows the same general pattern as districts in Aceh and South Sulawesi. Pemalang’s trajectory is also similar after a slow start, but the number of birth certificates facilitated in Pekalongan has remained consistently low. In contrast to Aceh and Sulawesi, FPLKD in Central Java has generally facilitated greater numbers of family cards and ID cards compared with birth certificates.

Table 20

**Number of CRVS documents processed via FPLKD
Brebes, Pekalongan and Pemalang Districts, Central Java (Jul 2019–Dec 2020)**




Source: KOMPAK Survey

5.4. Who is being assisted?

Limited data exists on the sex and age of people obtaining civil registration documents through FPLKD. Data in relation to birth certificates was collected for the first time between January and June 2021 (see Table 21). It shows moderately more males being assisted than females, and just under 45% of birth certificates going to children aged under 1 year.

Table 21

Sex/age of those assisted by CRVS facilitators to obtain birth certificates (Jan–Jun 2021)




Source: KOMPAK Village Survey

However, these figures should be interpreted with caution. They comprise a snapshot in time and do not represent what has happened before or what may happen after. For example, it would be reasonable to assume that, of birth certificates facilitated by FPLKD, the percentage going to children under 1 year

should gradually increase over time until theoretically reaching 100% after all older residents in a village have obtained one. The current percentage of just under 45% is but a point on that trajectory.

Better data exists on the percentage of villages reporting that their CRVS facilitator assisted people with disability (PWD). Table 22 shows the percentage has risen and fallen over time, but has never been greater than 50% during any one period. When a village reports a CRVS facilitator assisting PWD, the median number assisted ranges between three and five people, while the average ranges between six and 14 people.

Table 22
Percentage of villages reporting CRVS facilitator assisting PWD



Source: KOMPAK Village Survey

6. Looking forward: efficiency and incentives

For users of village-based civil registration services, it matters little who funds them – as long as they are funded. From a user-perspective, the primary measure of success is whether the process of obtaining civil registration documents is quicker, cheaper and/or easier than it would otherwise be.

However, the level of government that funds village-based CRVS facilitator model may influence the cost of providing them, and even whether they are provided at all. A costing analysis reveals that although the cost to districts or villages is not necessarily all that different, one variation of the village-funded model can generate some cost savings. The more important difference between levels of government relates to the availability of human resources and budget to implement the village-based model.

Understanding the cost of providing village-based CRVS facilitator model is also relevant to determining where and when their application makes the most sense. The relative benefit is likely to vary as a function of a village's location (distance from the district capital), socio-economic status, and existing level of civil registration coverage. At some point, particularly where cost is the primary barrier to access, it could be cheaper to subsidise some citizens costs directly rather than establish the architecture to provide services at the village level.

Finally, the question of why governments would fund village-based CRVS facilitator model deserves serious attention. The best-designed systems, even when not particularly resource intensive, are of little relevance if governments are not sufficiently motivated to prioritise their implementation. The fact that no district governments in KOMPAK-supported locations have implemented the existing government model – when it is not necessarily significantly more expensive than the FPLKD model – underscores why thinking about this is important.

6.1. Efficiency

Which model is more cost-effective?

The simplest way to measure the cost difference (if any) between the government and FPLKD models is by reference to the relative cost of human resources. Even under KOMPAK's village-funded model, the cost of training facilitators is commonly borne by districts. The costs of materials and transport should also be (or at least could be) the same, regardless of whether they are borne by districts or villages. These costs can therefore be excluded from the comparison.

Table 23 shows the theoretical cost structures for engaging a CRVS facilitator in a village via the regular model and various versions of the FPLKD model. The regular model assumes a civil servant (existing or newly recruited) is assigned as a village CRVS facilitator and paid by the district at the Group IIA level (no previous service). FPLKD model 1 assumes a village government official (existing or newly recruited) is tasked as a CRVS facilitator. FPLKD model 2 assumes the same, but with that person aided by two assistants drawn from the village community and contracted at a flat rate per month. FPLKD model 3 assumes a village community member is contracted as a CRVS facilitator at the regional minimum wage. FPLKD model 4 assumes eight part-time CRVS facilitators are drawn from the village community and contracted at a flat rate per month, assisted by four part-time data and administration staff.

Figures used in the models are drawn from Pemalang and Pekalongan Districts in Central Java. Villages applying a version of the FPLKD model in Pekalongan indicate that it requires approximately 30% of the time of one village official. Assuming the workload of a village official is comparable to that of a low-ranking civil servant, carrying out the same tasks should also account for approximately one-third of a low-ranking civil servant's standard workload. Table 23 shows costings for both 100% and 30% of a person's time allocated to FPLKD.

Under FPLKD model 1, there is only a small difference in the cost of staffing village-based CRVS facilitator model with a district-funded civil servant (regular model) and a village-funded village government official. The basic salary for either alternative is effectively identical, with the difference in costs coming from slightly lower allowances and no payment of *Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial* or BPJS (Social Security Administration Agency) premiums for village government officials. Assuming a 30% workload attribution, the government model is only approximately IDR 1.8 million more expensive per village per year than FPLKD model 1.

Table 23
Comparative theoretical staffing costs for village-based CRVS services

Monthly cost	Model				
	Government	FPLKD 1	FPLKD 2	FPLKD 3	FPLKD 4
Funder	District	Village	Village	Village	Village
Basic salary for one facilitator	IDR 2,022,000 (PNS/PPPK IIA level no previous service)	IDR 2,022,500 (Standard salary for village official)	IDR 2,022,500 (Standard salary for village official)	IDR 1,865,000 (Regional minimum wage)	N/A
Allowances	IDR 1,500,000	IDR 1,200,000	IDR 1,200,000	N/A	N/A
BPJS premiums	IDR 207,053	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Additional staff honorariums	N/A	N/A	IDR 800,000 (2 assistants @ IDR 400,000 each)	N/A	IDR 3,000,000 (8 facilitators @ IDR 250,000 each and 4 data collection and administration staff @ IDR 250,000 each)
Total per month	IDR 3,729,053	IDR 3,222,500	IDR 4,022,500	IDR 1,865,000	IDR 3,000,000
Total per year	IDR 44,748,636	IDR 38,670,000	IDR 48,270,000	IDR 22,380,000	IDR 36,000,000
Total per year – main facilitator @ 30%	IDR 13,424,590	IDR 11,601,000	IDR 21,201,000 (additional staff remain @ full rate)	IDR 6,714,000	IDR 36,000,000 (30% option N/A)

Source: KOMPAK Calculations (2021)

If new human resources are required, it is cheaper for a village to hire a CRVS facilitator directly rather than tasking a civil servant or village official. In this case, the cost of human resources is approximately half that of the alternatives, due to lower remuneration (regional minimum wage or less), and no payment of allowances or BPJS premiums. Whether this lower rate of pay has any impact on a CRVS facilitator’s motivation and hence effectiveness may vary depending on local labour market conditions.

However, tasking an existing civil servant or village government official as a CRVS facilitator (where possible) is likely to be more budget friendly. Doing so is effectively ‘free’ as it requires no additional expenditure on salary or allowances, subject to two critical assumptions:

- (i) That existing human resources have the capacity to perform this function without it encroaching on their existing responsibilities (that is, it assumes that they are currently under-utilised by 30% or more).
- (ii) That existing human resources are prepared to do additional work for no additional remuneration, even though, in theory, that additional work is already remunerated by their existing salary.


If these assumptions are not met, villages hiring a CRVS facilitator directly may still be preferable.

FPLKD models 2 and 4 involve hiring more than one person and are more expensive than other models assuming a 30% workload attribution. While they may have operational advantages, they would not be chosen if cost was the sole criterion.

Training and transport costs are on top of the figures presented in Table 23. Transport costs of approximately IDR 5 million per year have been estimated for both the government and FPLKD models. Training costs have not been estimated; to date they have commonly been borne by district civil registry offices.

While useful for comparative purposes, the models above may significantly overestimate real-world expenditure on FPLKD. Average annual village budget allocations for FPLKD have most commonly been in the range of IDR 3–4 million, although up to approximately IDR 8 million in NTB (see Table 24). Again, these figures do not include training costs, but should include the transport costs of CRVS facilitators.

Table 24
Average village budget allocation for FPLKD by province (2020)



Source: KOMPAK Survey

When do village-based CRVS facilitator model make the most sense?

Where implementing FPLKD requires incurring fixed costs, the cost per CRVS document facilitated will decrease as the number of documents facilitated increases. On a purely economic basis, this means that FPLKD will make the most sense when:

- (i) It can facilitate large numbers CRVS documents in a village.
- (ii) The cost of an individual arranging a document themselves is high.

Establishing a reasonable unit cost per document requires considering what a citizen would otherwise spend to arrange the document themselves (Note that this refers only to ancillary costs related to obtaining the document, such as transport – the document itself should be free). Anything equal to or less than what a citizen would spend themselves is a clear win for FPLKD. Paying a reasonable premium over what a citizen would spend themselves may also be justified on the basis that they would not necessarily have obtained the document without assistance from FPLKD. Paying double or more than what a citizen would pay themselves might constitute cause to question whether FPLKD is the most appropriate strategy.

What constitutes a reasonable unit cost will vary between provinces, districts, subdistricts, and even villages. Distance to the point of service provision and local transport costs will likely have the greatest impact on the unit cost. As a very rough estimate, considering the cost to citizens in KOMPAK-supported locations appears to fall mainly somewhere between IDR 50,000 and IDR 150,000 per document, reasonable unit costs would also mainly fall somewhere within (or slightly above) that range.

Bearing this in mind, Table 25 provides a basic starting point for thinking about the number of documents that need to be facilitated by FPLKD for it to be economically viable. Note that the cost of training village CRVS facilitators is not included here in the cost of FPLKD. Doing so would increase the number of documents required to be processed to generate a given unit cost.

Table 25

CRVS documents required to be facilitated by FPLKD to generate certain unit costs

Cost of FPLKD per village per year	Number of CRVS documents facilitated by FPLKD to generate unit cost per document of:			
	IDR 50,000	IDR 100,000	IDR 150,000	IDR 200,000
IDR 5 million	100	50	33	25
IDR 10 million	200	100	67	50
IDR 20 million	400	200	133	100
IDR 30 million	600	300	200	150

So, what unit costs have been achieved so far in implementing FPLKD? In short, it's impossible to know for sure, in the absence of data on the actual cost of implementing FPLKD in each village. However, some general insights can be derived by taking the median number of CRVS documents facilitated by FPLKD per village over a one-year period, and calculating unit costs per document based on a range of different FPLKD cost structures. Table 26 provides this data by province, based on KOMPAK survey data from KOMPAK-supported districts and subdistricts. Depending on the cost of FPLKD, the indicative unit cost per document ranges between IDR 27,000 and IDR 769,000.

Table 26

Indicative cost per CRVS document as facilitated by FPLKD

Cost of FPLKD per village per year	Median BC per village by FPLKD (2020)	Median KK per village by FPLKD (2020)	Median KTP per village by FPLKD (Jul 20–Jun 21)	Median combined total CRVS documents	Indicative unit cost per document (IDR) @ FPLKD cost per year			
					IDR 3 million	IDR 5 million	IDR 10 million	IDR 20 million
Aceh	11	15	0	26	115,000	192,000	385,000	769,000
Central Java	14	38	38	90	33,000	56,000	111,000	222,000
East Java	19	34	35	88	34,000	57,000	114,000	227,000
NTB	30	38	43	111	27,000	45,000	90,000	180,000
South Sulawesi	20	32	35	87	34,000	57,000	115,000	230,000

Source: KOMPAK Village Survey

Table 26 suggests that if the cost of implementing FPLKD is IDR 3–10 million per year, the unit cost per document is likely to be within the approximate range of what a citizen might spend themselves (excluding the value of any lost earnings). If so, the question returns to one of effectiveness – does subsidising the costs of obtaining CRVS documents result in significantly more citizens obtaining them? If yes, the investment is clearly worthwhile. If no, it may need to be reconsidered.

Table 26 also suggests that if the cost of implementing FPLKD is IDR 20 million per year or more, the unit cost per document is likely to exceed the direct costs that would have been incurred by a citizen themselves by an increasingly substantial margin. This provides some support for the reluctance of district governments to apply the regular model for village-based civil registration, where it would require hiring new civil servants or fixed-term staff (the cost of which would significantly exceed IDR 30 million per village). While it does not mean FPLKD should be automatically discounted as a policy option for the average village, at a cost of IDR 20 million per year or more, the results of any cost-benefit analysis will be increasingly skewed away from FPLKD.

While generalised estimates can provide useful guidance, the cost-benefit calculation will differ for individual villages and subdistricts, and also over time. Behind the generalised estimates in Table 26 will lie villages for which FPLKD has been unequivocally advantageous, as well as those for which it has not. Again, the main factors determining which category a village falls within will be the extent of demand for service, the cost of providing the service, and the cost of a citizen obtaining documents themselves. Demand in particular is unlikely to remain constant, meaning that FPLKD could start off being extremely cost-effective, but become less so over time as the number of people without CRVS documents decreases.

Which level of government should fund village-based CRVS facilitator model?

To the extent the choice is between village-funded services or nothing, the case for village funding is clear cut. Given the apparent reluctance of district governments in KOMPAK-supported locations to fund the government model, this may well be the overwhelming practical reality. However, what about approaching the question from a more principled perspective? Would the answer change?

Departing from the premise that funding should follow function, the level of government that should fund the FPLKD model is the level of government best placed to manage them. A reasonable presumption is that services should be managed at the level they are provided – that is, by villages. Not only should oversight of village CRVS facilitators be easier by virtue of a village government’s proximity to where they work, but so should appointing them. There will always be a village official resident in a village capable of being tasked as a CRVS facilitator, whereas the same may not necessarily apply to an existing district-funded civil servant. Also, if additional human resources are needed, it may be slightly cheaper and easier for villages to recruit them.

While preferable overall, village management of the FPLKD model is not without drawbacks. For example, appointment as a CRVS facilitator brings access to a source of income, which village heads can use as a source of patronage for their supporters. In addition to the risk of unsuitable candidates being selected, this also brings the risk of investments in training being forfeited when political conditions in the village change – recall the replacement of approximately 50–70% of village CRVS facilitators in Aceh after village head elections. Unfortunately, however, district-managed services would likely be equally exposed to patronage-based appointments and turnover.

Assuming villages are best placed to manage the FPLKD model, the real question is whether they should absorb that cost entirely from existing village budgets or engage in some form of cost-sharing with district governments. In practice, cost-sharing is already taking place, with districts covering or contributing to the cost of training village CRVS facilitators. However, what about operational costs? While the question deserves an answer, one of the primary drivers of the FPLKD approach (the lack of district funding for *petugas registrasi*) means that at present, any answer would be purely theoretical.

6.2. Incentives

Solving the technical challenges of implementing a Village-based CRVS Facilitator Model to civil registration is one thing. Implementing it at scale on a sustained basis is another altogether. At this point, given the focus on testing the FPLKD model, relatively less attention has been devoted to analysing the incentive structures that might support or undermine it in the longer-term. This is an area in which deeper thinking could pay dividends.

One reason for caution about the sustainability of FPLKD stems from the mismatch between incentives, resources and authority revealed by disaggregating the ‘supply side’ for civil registration services. District civil registry offices have an institutional mandate (and therefore at least a theoretical incentive) to increase civil registration coverage, but limited ability to do so by directly funding village-based civil registration services (see Box 6). Village community empowerment agencies (DPMD) have the authority to enable villages to allocate funds for FPLKD, but far fewer institutional incentives to do so. The extent to which villages themselves are incentivised to allocate funds to FPLKD depends on the extent to which citizens value and use the service, and the extent to which village governments are responsive to citizen preferences. Meanwhile, the agencies that might benefit most from CRVS data that is more complete and timely – for example, in the fields of education, health, public works and social services – have nothing to do with either the authorisation, funding or technical support for FPLKD.

The mismatch in incentives across sectors within district governments indicates the importance of higher-level support for FPLKD. This could come from either the district head or the district planning agency, both of whom have the convening power to bring sectoral agencies together and encourage (or enforce) cooperation. Entrepreneurial civil registry officials may be able to achieve this on their own, but would need to rely on a combination of tact and charm to do so.

National ministries or provincial agencies also have some influence on the willingness and ability of districts and villages to adopt the FPLKD model, but are generally subject to the same sectoral mismatch of authority and incentives that exists at the district level. Priorities for the use of village funds are set by the Ministry of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration. Increasing civil registration coverage is not part of its institutional mandate. Meanwhile, the agency with responsibility for that policy objective is the Directorate General of Population Administration and Civil Registration in the Ministry of Home Affairs. It reportedly continues to prefer its own district-funded village civil registration officer model, despite the inherent funding challenges and seemingly patchy implementation.

The other side of the equation is what drives demand from citizens themselves. This can be split into two parts – demand for civil registration documents, and the relative appeal of the FPLKD approach compared with other pathways for obtaining them. PUSKAPA (2016) outlines the importance of cultivating demand for civil registration documents and the challenge of creating incentives for registration without excluding the vulnerable (for example, by enforcing the requirement that a child has a birth certificate to be enrolled in school). In relation to FPLKD in particular, the question is why citizens might prefer it over other alternatives, including online application systems. This could usefully be the subject of future inquiry.

Box 6

It's not always about a technically sound approach...

So have there been any failures? Of course. There's one district where we tried [FPLKD], they wanted it, everyone wanted it, everyone agreed, but then it came down to funding. Village budgets are different in every district, which means they all have their own priorities, and as a result nothing has happened so far. Even though in principle they were prepared to do it. That's the challenge, so we said that in this phase, if there's a district that feels they're not ready [to establish FPLKD], we can't force them to do it.

For example, in Banda Aceh municipality, we hoped we could work together. But we also can't deny that in Banda Aceh municipality [CRVS document] coverage is already quite good and [documents] can be processed online, and so on. If they haven't established [FPLKD] it's not really a problem because they already have good coverage. So, we can't say [that FPLKD] must be established. We let districts and municipalities decide for themselves. If they think [FPLKD] is necessary, go for it. If not, no problem either, because geographic conditions aren't all the same. Like in Bener Meriah, Takengon, those are mountainous regions, where not everywhere is easily accessible. If you have village CRVS facilitators there it can be really helpful. But in the city, because distance isn't an issue, [citizens] can go directly [to the civil registration office] or apply online. For that reason, we've never forced districts/ municipalities to establish [FPLKD] or engage village CRVS facilitators.

Aceh provincial government official, Political Economy Analysis of KOMPAK Policy and Political Economy Analysis (KOMPAK 2022, forthcoming)

7. Conclusion

Good reasons exist for focusing on increasing access to civil registration services in Indonesia.

Although registration rates have been steadily increasing in recent years, those living in rural areas and from lower income groups are significantly less likely to possess a birth certificate than those in urban areas and from high income groups. Papua and Papua Barat, in particular, lag behind other provinces in civil registration.

Good reasons also exist for favouring a village-based facilitator model to delivering civil registration services.

The primary benefits of doing so include practically eliminating the cost and time barriers to civil registration, by removing the need for citizens to travel to a civil registry office in the district capital. A village-based approach may also be more effective at reaching particularly marginalised populations, who are not engaged in the health or education systems.

As this paper has documented, KOMPAK – in partnership with subnational governments – has developed a model for delivering village-based civil registration services (FPLKD) and demonstrated that it can be implemented.

The main difference with the current government *petugas registrasi* model is how it is staffed and implemented. FPLKD gets around the challenge of district civil registration offices not having sufficient funds to hire *petugas registrasi* directly, by using the village budget to engage CRVS facilitators.

So, what interim conclusions can be drawn about FPLKD? Returning to KOMPAK's three learning priorities, what do we know about the effectiveness and efficiency of the FPLKD, and the extent to which it is supported or undermined by current incentive structures?

Effectiveness

- It is very likely FPLKD has made access to civil registration services cheaper for citizens, based on the limited data that exists. It should also have made access easier, although we have no data that could assist in quantifying the extent of any change.
- FPLKD should reduce the time spent applying for civil registration documents, although again we have no data to help quantify the extent of any reduction. However, FPLKD doesn't necessarily result in people getting documents faster. Anecdotal evidence suggests that citizens sometimes seek help from CRVS facilitators to collect documents and fill in forms, but then take them to the civil registry office themselves to speed up the process.
- Methodological and data limitations mean it is impossible to know for sure whether FPLKD has increased the number of people with civil registration documents. It almost certainly has, but whether by a lot or a little remains unclear.
- Similarly, sparse and time-limited data means it is difficult to draw conclusions about who FPLKD is helping most. It is at least clear that parents are using it to obtain birth certificates for their newborn babies, and that constituted a significant proportion of birth certificates facilitated by FPLKD in the period January–June 2021. It is also clear that at least some people with disabilities have been assisted by FPLKD, with the percentage of villages reporting such assistance being provided trending upwards from January 2019 to June 2020, before trending down again from June 2020. However, no data exists about the socio-economic background of those assisted by FPLKD, a key predictor of the likelihood a person possesses civil registration documents.

Efficiency

- If new human resources are required to implement Village-based CRVS Facilitator Model, FPLKD is likely more cost-effective than the regular model. This is because it can be cheaper for villages to hire new human resources directly. If existing human resources are used, the cost difference between the two models is negligible.
- If rolling out the regular model required hiring new civil servants to implement it – bringing the estimated cost per village to around IDR 40 million – district governments’ reluctance to do so seems justified. MoHA should perform a cost-benefit analysis on their model and reconsider its appropriateness in cases where existing civil servants cannot be tasked as civil registration officers.
- Assuming villages real spend on FPLKD so far has been in the range IDR 2–8 million per year, the unit cost per document facilitated has likely been roughly the same to double what it would have cost a citizen to obtain it themselves, based on the number of documents processed by FPLKD to date. If that results in people obtaining civil registration documents who otherwise would not have, that seems like a good investment.
- Spending more than about IDR 20 million per year on FPLKD is unlikely to be a good investment, assuming average transport costs and numbers of documents facilitated by FPLKD.
- Applying FPLKD to every village in a district on a blanket basis is also unlikely to be a good investment. It should be targeted based on demand for documents and cost/difficulty of citizens obtaining them for themselves. Given demand for documents is likely to vary over time, so too may the appropriateness of the FPLKD model in a particular village.

Incentives

- The incentive structures supporting the longer-term implementation of FPLKD at scale are not particularly strong. The main problem is that the agency with the ability to authorise villages to fund FPLKD (DPMD) has no inherent institutional interest in widening access to civil registration services. Funding for FPLKD is therefore at risk of being displaced by other funding priorities.
- The greater the support for civil registration by the district head and/or the district planning agency, the greater the likelihood of the FPLKD approach being sustained. This is because these higher-level actors are better placed to facilitate coordination and cooperation between sectoral agencies with differing interests and priorities in relation to civil registration.

The final point to make relates to data. It will be clear from the above that the primary challenge in assessing the performance of FPLKD is limited data. Collecting data has costs, in both money and time. In future, district civil registration offices should identify the data that is most analytically useful and focus on that.

The best thing to do would simply be to track the number of CRVS documents applied for through the FPLKD channel. This could be done at the civil registry office to avoid more complicated and time-consuming recording and collection of data at the village level (although villages should still track numbers of documents facilitated to help them figure out whether funding FPLKD is worthwhile).

Provided districts also count the total number of CRVS documents issued, having data on numbers of documents facilitated by FPLKD allows for the calculation of percentages. A high percentage of documents being facilitated by FPLKD indicates popularity and should prompt further support, whereas a low percentage of documents being facilitated by FPLKD should provide a trigger for questioning why that is so.

The other priority is trying to find out who is using FPLKD. If the data shows that the greatest predictor of possession of civil registration documents is economic status and location (urban or rural), it would be worth spending time trying to work out whether FPLKD is effectively reaching those on the bottom half of the income ladder and in remote areas, and how to track that.

References

Kusumaningrum, S., Bennouna, C., Siagian, C., & Agastya, N.L.P.M. (2016). *Back to what counts: Birth and death in Indonesia*. Jakarta, Indonesia: The Center on Child Protection Universitas Indonesia (PUSKAPA) in collaboration with the Ministry of National Development Planning (BAPPENAS) and KOMPAK.

Kusumaningrum, S., Arifiani, S.D., Sari, W.L., Sahputra, F., Usman, R., Wandasari, W., Jati, H., & Rahmi, M.A. (2020). *Strong institutions, resilient communities: An assessment of the basic services governance and results in CRVS, education, and health in KOMPAK areas*. Jakarta, Indonesia: University of Indonesia's Centre on Child Protection and Wellbeing (PUSKAPA) in collaboration with the National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS) and KOMPAK.